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The Plight of the Personal Manager in
California: A Legislative Solution
by GARY A. GREENBERG*
I
Introduction
California is a leader in the entertainment industry, with
film, music, television, and other useful arts constituting a sig-
nificant part of the state's economy. The people responsible
for keeping the arts a thriving business include a variety of art-
ists, along with their managers, promoters, and distributors.
One critical role in this process is played by a manager com-
monly referred to as a "personal manager."
A personal manager's primary tasks include advising and
counseling an artist in the selection of artistic material, as well
as advising him or her in all matters relating to public relations
and the proper format for presentation of an artist's talents. A
personal manager will also advise and counsel an artist on the
general practices in the entertainment industry and help select
other persons who might provide such advice or procure em-
ployment for the artist.' If an artist does not have a separate
road manager or business manager, these tasks may be per-
formed by the personal manager as well.2 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, personal management relationships are highly
personal; the artist may depend on the manager for emotional
support and for resolution of conflicts between the artist and
his co-workers.3
* Member, Third Year Class, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California
at Berkeley; B.A., Brown University, 1979. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Professor Edward Rubin of the Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California at Berkeley.
1. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Bank of America Nat'l Trust ex reL Marx v. Fleming,
No. 1098 ASC MP-432 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1982).
2. HEARINGS ON THE LICENSING & REGULATION OF ARTIST MANAGERS, PERSONAL
MANAGERS AND MusicIANs BOOKING AGENCIES BEFORE THE CAL. SENATE COMMrrrEE
ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 171, 172 (1975) (statement of Arnold Mills, President of the
Conference of Personal Managers West) [hereinafter cited as HEARINGS].
3. Id. at 159 (statement of Joe Smith, President of Warner Bros. Records). For a
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The personal manager, whose duties are confined to those
enumerated above, is not currently regulated by statute in Cal-
ifornia. California law distinguishes a personal manager from
a "talent agent," who is defined by a state licensing statute as
"a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of pro-
curing, offering, promising or attempting to procure employ-
ment or engagements for an artist or artists."4
The unregulated status of personal managers has come
under attack in recent years from both entertainment unions
and licensed talent agencies. They contend that personal man-
agers perform substantially the same services as talent agents
and, as such, should be subject to the same licensing and regu-
latory requirements.5
The most current manifestation of these attacks is California
Assembly Bill 997, passed on August 30, 1982. Among other
provisions, the bill added Article IV to the Talent Agency Act
(Act), which created the California Entertainment Commis-
sion.6 The Commission is instructed to:
study the laws and practices of this State, the State of New
York, and other entertainment capitals of the United States re-
lating to the licensing of agents and representatives of artists
in the entertainment industry in general, and the recording in-
dustry in particular, so as to enable the commission to recom-
mend to the Legislature a model bill regarding this licensing.7
detailed discussion of the tasks performed by personal managers, see S. SCHEMEL & M.
KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 71-72 (2d ed. 1977).
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). The title of the Act was
amended in 1978, replacing the "Artists' Managers Act" of 1959 with the "Talent
Agency Act." For a legislative history of the Artists' Managers Act, see Note, The Per-
sonal Manager in California: Riding The Horns of the Licensing Dilemma, 1 CoMM/
ENT L.J. 347, 357-58 (1978).
5. HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 48-49 (statement of Terry Sloan, legal counsel to the
Screen Actors Guild).
6. Also provided in the bill: § 1700.4 of the California Labor Code is amended to
exclude from regulation and licensing under the Act the activities of procuring, offer-
ing, or promising to procure recording contracts; § 1700.44 is amended to exclude from
liability under the Act persons acting in conjunction with, and at the request of, a li-
censed and franchised talent agent; § 1700.44 is further amended to place a one-year
statute of limitations on violations of the Act; § 1700.46, providing for criminal penalties
for violations of the Act, is repealed. The provisions cure only a few of the inequities in
the Act. Current enforcement is to remain in effect only until the Entertainment Com-
mission completes its report. Originally A.B. 997 was to expire on January 1, 1985. This
date has been extended by A.B. 3753 to January 1, 1986 to accommodate the extended
life of the Entertainment Commission. Assembly Bill 3753, sponsored by Assembly-
man Robinson, was signed into law on July 17, 1984. Telephone interview with Assem-
blyman Robinson's staff (Oct. 16, 1984).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1702 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
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Composed of three licensed talent agents, three personal man-
agers, three artists, and the Labor Commissioner, the Commis-
sion began conducting public hearings in February 19848 and is
required to report its recommendations to the Legislature and
the Governor no later than October 1, 1984.1 One of its central
tasks will be to make recommendations for the regulation of
personal managers.
This note considers the plight of the personal manager in the
California entertainment industry through an examination of
current legal and administrative rules and the economic
problems they create.' 0 It discusses possible solutions to these
problems and concludes with a proposal to amend the Talent
Agency Act and to create a "Personal Managers Act," which
could be recommended by the California Entertainment Com-
mission to the Legislature. Because of the crucial role that
personal managers play in the development of new talent and
in the continued success of established artists," this note ar-
gues for regulation designed to encourage and foster personal
management relationships.
II
Nature of the Problem
A. The Need for Personal Managers to Procure Employment
Although personal managers have resisted attempts at regu-
lation in the past,'2 regulation may be the best solution to an
8. Id. § 1701.
9. Id. § 1703. California Assembly Bill 3753 has extended the reporting date by
one year to October 1, 1985.
10. The primary legal and administrative rules considered in this note include:
The Talent Agency Act, Screen Actors Guild Regulations, American Federation of
Televison and Radio Artists Regulations Governing Agents, and decisions rendered by
the California Labor Commissioner's office in San Francisco. Petitions are also deter-
mined by the Labor Commissioner's office in Los Angeles. A survey of the ifies of the
Labor Commissioner's office in Los Angeles and a comparison and consideration of the
critical questions such as venue between the two offices, however, are beyond the
scope of this note.
11. The president of Warner Bros. Records has said, "the role of the personal man-
ager,. . . in our estimation, is absolutely vital to the career of the great bulk of record-
ing artists today." HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 159.
12. As originally introduced in the 1977-1978 term, the Artists' Managers Act, in the
form of A.B. 2535, contained a provision for the separate licensing of personal manag-
ers. This provision encountered heavy opposition from the personal manager lobby
and was ultimately deleted from the bill as enacted in CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.46
in 1979. Johnson & Lang, The Personal Manager in the California Entertainment Indus-
try, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 405-08 (1979).
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important problem currently confronting the profession: most
personal managers, at some point in their careers, engage in
activity already covered by the Talent Agency Act.'3 They
must then either obtain a talent agent's license or act in viola-
tion of the statute.
The most common instance in which a personal manager
finds himself in this situation is where he discovers or takes on
a new artist. Because artists in the inchoate stages of their ca-
reers do not command significant earning power, they can
neither attract nor afford the services of a licensed talent
agent. According to Roger Davis, Vice President of the William
Morris Agency, "With respect to recording artists, for example,
or musical groups ... we very often do not sign [them] until
they have a record because our overhead is so high."' 4
B. The Personal Manager as Investor
A common practice of personal managers is to invest finan-
cially in their clients. 5 Most new artists require equipment
and living expenses, as well as promotional and performing ex-
penses. Often, the personal manager is the only available
source for this capital. 6 As a result, the personal manager's
money is spent to groom and support an unproven artist who
cannot obtain employment because no licensed talent agent
will represent him or her.
A personal manager in this position could obtain a talent
agent's license and solicit engagements on his own. However,
obtaining a license can be expensive 17 and may subject the
personal manager to oppressive guild requirements that could
prevent him from receiving compensation which fairly reflects
the services he renders. 8 If, on the other hand, the personal
manager chooses to engage in activity covered by the Act with-
out obtaining a license, he faces severe sanctions by the Labor
Commissioner's office, including forfeiture of all past and fu-
13. HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 89 (statement of Henry W. Armantrout, President of
the American Federation of Musicians, Local No. 7).
14. Id. at 40.
15. Id. at 137 (statement of Walter Lorimer, Esq., legal counsel to the Conference
of Personal Managers).
16. Id. at 173, 185 (statements of Arnold Mills and Joe Gottfried, Secretary of the
Conference of Personal Managers West). See also infra text accompanying notes 52
and 75.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 18-24.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 26-44.
[Vol. 6
PLIGHT OF THE PERSONAL MANAGER
ture compensation paid under his management agreements.' 9
The personal manager who has secured employment for a
new artist is thus placed in a no-win situation. The effect of
this dilemma is to discourage personal managers from per-
forming the crucial task of nurturing new talent. The real loser
is the consumer, who suffers from a decline in the quality of
available entertainment.
III
The Elements of the Problem
A. The High Cost of Complying with the Talent Agency Act
The cost of obtaining a license to act as a talent agent in Cali-
fornia may range from $300 to more than $1,225. This amount
includes a filing fee of $25, an annual licensing fee of $225, and
an annual office fee of $50 for each branch office maintained. °
Additional fees are charged for applications to transfer or as-
sign a license.21 The statute also requires the deposit of a
surety bond in the sum of $1,000,22 which can be financed at a
rate of approximately five percent.23 In addition, a substantial
expenditure may be necessary in order to comply with the
statutory requirement that a talent agent maintain an office for
conducting business, which cannot also be used for residential
24purposes.
These requirements have a negative impact on investment
by personal managers in developing talent in that they sub-
tract capital from the already scarce resources available. The
statute poses the greatest obstacle to the personal manager
whose clients are in the weakest financial position and are,
therefore, the least able to support themselves or retain a tal-
ent agent to procure employment for them. Additionally, the
requirements are excessive for the personal manager who en-
gages in employment-related activity incidentally or only be-
cause he is unable to secure the services of a licensed talent
agent to represent his clients.25
19. See infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.12 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
21. Id. § 1700.13.
22. Id. § 1700.15.
23. There is a minimum annual charge of $75. Telephone interview with Sonya
Martinez of the Al Barker Bonding Company in San Fransisco (Apr. 9, 1984).
24. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.9 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
25. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 14.
No. 41
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B. Inequitable Union Regulation
If any of the personal manager's clients are members of an
entertainment union, there is the second obstacle of restrictive
union franchise agreements.2 6 Union bylaws require that
agents who procure employment for union artists be
"franchised."27 These franchise agreements limit the amount
of commissons and the duration for which exclusive represen-
tation can be maintained and proscribe certain types of busi-
ness activities that talent agents may concurrently engage in.
1. Maximum Commissions
The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(AFTRA) and the Screen Actor's Guild (SAG) limit the maxi-
mum commissions that a talent agent may receive to ten per-
cent of the artist's gross earnings from an engagement.28 The
unions do not authorize the payment of commissions for per-
sonal management services and proscribe aganist the payment
of more than ten percent to any franchisee for any particular
engagement.29
The American Federation of Musicians (AF of M) has taken
steps to correct this oversight. It allows a maximum commis-
sion of twenty percent for the booking of one-night engage-
ments and fifteen percent for engagements of two days or
longer.3 0 Like those of SAG and AFTRA, these are maximums
that can be paid to a franchisee for any particular engage-
ment.3 The AF of M, however, also allows a franchised talent
agent to sign a "personal management agreement" which al-
lows the franchisee who acts as both personal manager and
26. The three principal unions in the entertainment industry affecting personal
managers are: The Screen Actors Guild (SAG), The American Federation of Musi-
cians (AF of M), and The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AF-
TRA). See Johnson & Lang, supra note 12, at 412.
27. See Constitution By-Laws and Policy of the American Federation of Musicians
of the U.S. and Canada, art. XXIII, §§ 5-6, at 129 (rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as AF
of M By-Laws]; Screen Actors Guild Agency Regulations, Amended Rule 16(g), § III, at
2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rule 16(g)]; American Federation of Television and Ra-
dio Artists Regulations Governing Agents, Rule 12-B, § XX, at 21-22 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as AFTRA Rule 12-B].
28. AF'TRA Rule 12-B, supra note 27, § XX, at 21-22; Rule 16(g), supra note 27, § XI,
at 18-23.
29. AFITRA Rule 12-B, supra note 27, § XX, at 21-22; Rule 16(g), supra note 27, § XI,
at 18-23.
30. AF of M By-Laws, supra note 27, art. XXIII, § 8, at 130.
31. Id.
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booking agent for his client to receive an additional five per-
cent commission. 32
Therefore, if a personal manager who had obtained a talent
agent's license booked an engagement for a client who is a
member of SAG or AFTRA, the maximum commission he
could be paid for all his services would be ten percent. If his
client were a member of AF of M, the maximum would be
twenty to twenty-five percent. In general, these figures do not
fairly reflect industry norms. Talent agents are generally paid
ten percent of the artist's gross earnings.3 Personal managers
generally charge from ten to twenty-five percent, with fifteen or
twenty percent being the most commonly accepted figures. 34
Industry standards would indicate that a manager who acts in
both capacities should be paid from twenty to thirty-five per-
cent of the artist's gross earnings. For the personal manager
who has placed himself financially at risk, the percentage could
fairly be placed even higher.
2. Prohibiting Equity Interests
A logical alternative for the manager who is also at financial
risk would be for him to contract for an equity interest in the
total earnings of the artist in addition to the commission he is
paid for his services. Such a contractual agreement would
comport with accepted business principles that the rate of re-
turn on investment should fairly reflect the risks involved. Yet
each of the entertainment unions precludes franchised talent
agents from obtaining equity interests in their artist's total
earnings or in the "production or distribution" of artistic prod-
ucts generally.
3. Limiting the Duration of Management Contracts
The unions also regulate the duration of the artist-manager
relationship. The Talent Agency Act does not limit the amount
of time that an artist may sign with an agent. The only statu-
tory limit on this relationship is § 2855 of the California Labor
Code, which provides that contracts to render personal serv-
32. Id.
33. Johnson & Lang, supra note 12, at 416 n.207.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., AF of M By-Laws, supra note 27, art. XXIII, § 11, at 133; Rule 16(g),
supra note 27, § XVI-B, at 28.
No. 41
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ices may not be enforced beyond seven years. 36 SAG and AF-
TRA limit the term of an agreement to three years in most
circumstances. 37 SAG bylaws provide that in certain circum-
stances, the term of an agreement cannot exceed an initial
term of one year.38 AF of M allows a term of five years in most
situations and up to seven years in others.39 The personal
manager has a strong stake in at least maintaining options to
extend agreements from five to seven years in order to protect
his ability to receive a return on money invested in the artist
during earlier, less profitable years.
The guilds also provide that artists may terminate agree-
ments if the manager fails to obtain work within specified peri-
ods of time.40 These provisions do not account for the common
practice of removing artists from the mainstream at certain
points in their careers in order to groom and refine their acts.
One reason for these inequities is that, except for limited
provisions of the AF of M, the guilds do not recognize personal
managers.4 This attitude persists despite the unquestionable
impact that personal managers have on the guild's constitu-
ents. Guild recognition of personal managers would permit ne-
gotiation over the provisions discussed above. Such
negotiation would benefit all parties concerned by leading to a
more comprehensive and realistic set of rules and regulations
governing artist representation.
4. Union Sanctions and Power
A union member who accepts employment from a non-
franchised agent is subject to union discipline in the form of a
fine, suspension, or expulsion from the union.42 Suspension or
expulsion can result in virtual unemployment for an artist who
depends upon union controlled employers for the bulk of his
work.43
36. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1971).
37. AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 27, § XIII-B(1), at 15; Rule 16(g), supra note 27,
§ XI-K(2), at 22.
38. Rule 16(g), supra note 27 § XI-K(1), at 22.
39. AF of M By-Laws, supra note 27, art. XXIII, § 9, at 131-33.
40. See, e.g., id.
41. See, e.g., Meyer, Advice on Agents, Screen Actor Newsletter, Dec. 1982, at 4, col.
1.
42. See, e.g., Constitution and By-Laws of Screen Actors Guild Inc., art.VIII, at 9
(1981).
43. Employers who are parties to a collective bargaining agreement with the un-
ions are not permitted to hire union members against whom sanctions have been
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A union may proceed against a manager or his client for non-
compliance with union regulations whether or not the manager
is licensed by the Labor Commissioner as a talent agent. How-
ever, licensing makes the manager's involvement in employ-
ment-related activities more conspicuous and increases the
chances that his activity will come to the attention of a union.
The ability of entertainment unions to enforce their bylaws
and regulations is not absolute. The three unions vary in the
control of their markets, but none has complete control over its
segments of the industry. The AF of M, for example, controls
only certain types of institutionalized musical engagements.
Most private club performances are not unionized because
club owners cannot afford to pay union rates. For the same
reason, many albums are produced with nonunion musicians
or with union musicians who are willing to accept less than
scale.4
Therefore, only some personal managers who decide to pro-
cure employment for their clients are subject to union restric-
tions. Furthermore, instances of union enforcement of their
regulations against personal managers are extremely rare.4
There is, however, no guarantee that a union will not impose
sanctions on a personal manager or union artist in a given situ-
ation, and for those personal managers representing artists
who depend upon union controlled employment, the problem
is very real.
In sum, the cost of obtaining a talent agent's license, or the
restrictions on fees and services that result, could drive some
personal managers out of business and keep others from enter-
ing it, thereby reducing the amount of new talent that reaches
the public.
C. Regulation by the Labor Commissioner
1. Establishing Jurisdiction
An alternative-and sometimes the only alternative-for the
personal manager who becomes involved in booking is to run
the risk of noncompliance with the Talent Agency Act. The
consequences of noncompliance, however, can be disastrous.
taken, and union members are not allowed to work with union members who are not in
good standing with the union. See, e.g., AF of M By-Laws, supra note 27, art. X, § 5, at
72.
44. See S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsmovsxy, supra note 3, at 51.
45. Johnson & Lang, supra note 12, at 402.
No. 4]
COMM/ENT L. J.
An artist may bring an unlicensed talent agent before the La-
bor Commissioner through a "petition to determine contro-
versy."46 The availability of such an action was relatively
unknown in the industry prior to 1966, until the now-famous
case of Buchwald v. Superior Court.47 That case, or more accu-
rately that series of cases, brought to the attention of the en-
tertainment industry the broad grant of jurisdiction and power
of the Labor Commissioner in these matters.
Original jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner to deter-
mine controversy under the Talent Agency Act arises in two
principal types of cases. The first is where a licensed talent
agent or an artist represented by a licensed talent agent peti-
tions the Labor Commissioner to resolve a controversy arising
under the Act.48 For example, a licensed talent agent may peti-
tion for reimbursement of unpaid money advanced under con-
tract to a client for living and promotional expenses.
49
Similarly, an artist may petition to obtain payment for a com-
pleted engagement directly from his or her licensed talent
agent if the employer fails to pay and the talent agent fails to
take "prudent and necessary steps to safeguard [the artist's]
earnings." 0
Thus, the Talent Agency Act, through the Labor Commis-
sioner, regulates the artist-manager relationship by imposing a
high standard of care upon the licensed talent agent and a duty
upon the artist represented by the talent agent to honor his or
her legitimate contractual obligations.
The second and more controversial type of case over which
the Labor Commissioner has jurisdiction is that in which an
artist files a petition, claiming that his or her manager has vio-
lated the Act by acting as an unlicensed talent agent.5
This was the claim asserted in Buchwald. In 1965, each of
the members of the musical group the Jefferson Airplane en-
tered into identical five-year exclusive personal management
contracts with Matthew Katz. The agreement provided that
Katz was to receive twenty percent of the group's earnings as
46. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1984). § 1700.44 also pro-
vides for a one-year statute of limitations.
47. 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
48. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44, supra note 46.
49. See, e.g., Schram v. Kinsey, No. TAC 11-81 SF MP 108, at 2-3 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r
1983).
50. See, e.g., Barrette v. Marie, No. TAC 48-82 at 2 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1983).
51. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 360-61, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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well as publishing income for acting as its personal manager.52
Mr. Katz discovered and organized the individual musicians
into a group. According to Howard Thaler, legal counsel to the
Conference on Personal Managers who helped Katz negotiate
a record contract for the band, Mr. Katz housed, fed, clothed,
and gave the group allowances for approximately a year and a
half. He also rented a rehearsal hall for them and bought their
instruments, among other things.53
During the first year of their relationship, the band decided
to terminate its agreement with Katz. Pursuant to the con-
tract, Katz commenced a proceeding with the American Arbi-
tration Association.54 Attorneys for the Airplane responded by
filing an action in the Superior Court of San Francisco to enjoin
the pending arbitration, claiming that the Labor Commissioner
had original jurisdiction over the controversy. 55 The court
ruled against the Airplane, commenting in substance: "This
personal manager took them up off the street, made successes
out of them, and now they want to dump him. '56 The Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that where a prima facie showing was
made that a party did act as an artist's manager, the Labor
Commissioner has the power and the duty to determine
whether the controversy was within the grant of jurisdiction of
the Artist/Managers Act.57
2. A Critique of the Labor Commissioner's Determination
in Buchwald v. Katz
The Labor Commissioner heard Katz's case in 1969.58 De-
spite testimony that on numerous occasions Katz unsuccess-
fully attempted to place the group with a talent agency, the
Labor Commissioner ruled that Katz had acted as an unli-
censed artists' manager and declared the personal manage-
ment agreements invalid9.5  The ruling also invalidated a
52. Johnson & Lang, supra note 12, at 396 n.131.
53. HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 207 (statement of Howard L. Thaler, legal counsel to
the Conference of Personal Managers).
54. Buchwald 254 Cal. App. 2d at 352, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
55. Id. at 353, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
56. HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 208 (statement of Howard Thaler).
57. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 360-61, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Determinations by the
Labor Commissioner can be tried de novo. See Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 502, 503
P.2d 1376, 1381, 105 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 (1972).
58. Buchwald v. Katz., No. AMSF 00017 at 1 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Katz].
59. Id. at 2.
No. 41
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publishing contract and a recording contract that Katz had
with the band and ordered Katz to repay approximately $50,000
in commissions he had received. Additionally, he was denied
reimbursement for money he spent in furtherance of the
60group's career.
The state retains the power to punish noncompliance with
its regulations in order to ensure that they are effectively fol-
lowed. However, the result in Katz constitutes an abuse of reg-
ulatory power. The order to refund past commissions and to
deny reimbursement for money advanced is unprecedented. If
performance of an illegal contract has commenced, the court
will generally leave the parties where it finds them.6 1 Possible
remedies include recission of the illegal contract, which pre-
cludes any prospective compensation, but do not include re-
payment of past consideration.2
The remedy in Katz is unfair. The damages levied against
Katz were grossly disproportionate to the harm he caused, if
any. It was not alleged that in managing the Jefferson Airplane
Katz had acted in an unconscientious manner, in bad faith, or
in breach of any common law duties. In fact, he played a vital
role in the group's success. Yet, the fact that he did not obtain
a talent agent's license cost him not only his stake in that suc-
cess, but also a significant amount of his time, effort, and
money. In addition, the members of the band received what
might be called a windfall; they retained the benefit of Katz's
labor and investment without having to compensate him for it.
Finally, one could argue that the result in Katz is economi-
cally inefficient. The threat of bringing a personal manager
before the Labor Commissioner has now become a powerful
weapon that an artist can use against a personal manager. The
availability of this threat creates an imbalance in bargaining
power whenever a genuine dispute arises between the parties.
This imbalance enables an artist to terminate a management
agreement virtually at will. Thus, a personal manager who is
instrumental in developing an act can easily be cut off from
sharing in the artist's success. 3
60. Id.
61. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILaO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 22-25 (2d ed. 1977).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 177 (statement of George Durgeom).
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D. Survey and Critique of Determinations by the San Francisco
Labor Commissioner's Office
The harsh result in Katz shocked the industry and put per-
sonal managers on notice of the serious consequences they
face in procuring employment without a license. An examina-
tion of decisions rendered by the Labor Commissioner's office
in San Francisco since 1976 reveals that the general principles
established in Katz have been applied to a wide range of activi-
ties and remedies. 6
4
1. The Method of Inquiry
Buchwald established that, in exercising jurisdiction under
the Act, the Labor Commissioner through a hearing officer65 is
empowered to "search out illegality lying behind the form in
which a transaction has been cast for the purpose of concealing
such illegality."66 Hearing officers have interpreted this princi-
ple as a directive to investigate all aspects of an artist-manager
relationship for possible violations of the Act. Therefore, it has
been determined by the Labor Commissioner that, consistent
with Buchwald,6 7 the hearing officer has jurisdiction to deter-
mine all disputes, including the existence of collateral con-
tracts and agreements, termination rights, and liabilities
thereunder.
68
The hearing officer may base his determination on relevant
testimony and documentary evidence. In most cases, the bur-
den of proving a violation is easily met by unrefuted evidence
or testimony. In the event of conflicting evidence or testimony,
the burden of proving a violation of the Act by something ap-
proximating a preponderance of the evidence rests with the
petitioner.69 Evidence that the manager represented himself to
a third party as an agent or resisted attempts by other licensed
64. Again, it is important to point out that any comprehensive conclusions must
include petitions determined by the Los Angeles office. Johnson and Lang assert that
the chances of victory for a personal manager appear to be significantly lower in San
Francisco. Johnson & Lang, supra note 12, at 389 n.94. In surveying the San Francisco
determinations, distinctions from the Los Angeles office will be footnoted where avail-
able. See, e.g., infra notes 83 and 84.
65. Hearing officers are lawyers employed by the Labor Commissioner's Office.
66. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 355, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
67. The other significant California court decision on point is Raden v. Laurie, 120
Cal. App. 2d 778, 262 P.2d 61 (1963).
68. Womack v. Smith, No. TAC 22-82 at 6. (Cal Lab. Comm'r 1982).
69. Id. at 7 (dismissing petitioner's claim of manipulation by respondent because
of insubstantial evidence).
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agents to establish an agency relationship with an artist has
been found to support an inference that the manager must
have been performing those services himself.7 0
The Act requires every licensed talent agent to keep records
approved by the Labor Commissioner, including an accounting
of all fees received from artists.7' The Act also requires the li-
censed talent agent to submit a copy of those records to the
Labor Commissioner upon request.72 The Labor Commis-
sioner may also consider any financial records submitted by
the parties as evidence. He may not, however, subpoena the
financial records of an unlicensed talent agent.73 Thus, a hear-
ing officer is limited in the extent to which he may search out
documentary evidence of compensation received by a manager
alleged to have procured employment for an artist without a
license. This need not pose an insurmountable obstacle to a
finding in favor of the artist's petition since the hearing officer
may rely upon the artist's financial statement in determining a
violation of the Act. 4
Therefore, in determining whether an unlicensed talent
agent has violated the Act, the hearing officer is not limited to
an evaluation of any specific agreement entered into by the
parties, but is empowered to engage in a wide range of inquir-
ies, and may draw inferences from all the evidence, in order to
discern the true relationship of the parties.
In one recent petition, Kennedy v. Lavin,71 where an unli-
censed manager was found not to have violated the Act, the
hearing officer based his determination on testimony by coun-
sel of both parties that the manager never sought employment
for his client and on the fact that the manager had advanced to
the artist over $122,000 in furtherance of his career.7 6 The of-
ficer concluded that, given the amount of money invested and
the supporting testimony, it was logical to infer that the man-
ager would not violate the Act and risk losing all his money.77
70. Pryor v. Franklin, No. TAC17 MP114 at 12 (Cal, Lab. Comm'r 1982).
71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.26 (West 1971 and Cum. Supp. 1984).
72. Id. at §§ 1700-1700.27.
73. Pryor, No. TAC17 MP114 at 20.
74. Nice v. Skid Row Studios, No. TAC 22-81 SF MP 119 at 3 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r
1983).
75. No. TAC 27-82 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1983).
76. Id. at 6 (the $122,000 included payments to producers, rental charges for stu-
dios and instruments, salaries for musicians and background vocalists, fees for engi-
neering services, and cash payments).
77. Id. at 4-6.
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This, of course, assumes that the manager was aware of the
Labor Commissioner's power to declare his investment a for-
feiture if he were found in violation of the Act-an assumption
not easily made. However, the determination in Kennedy is
significant in that it reveals the extent to which a hearing of-
ficer may utilize inferential analysis, and the gaps in factual
conclusions that may accompany such analysis, in reaching his
decision.
2. Triggering the Talent Agency Act
To find a violation of the Act, the hearing officer must deter-
mine that the petitioners are within the statutory definition of
"artists"78 and that the respondent functioned as a "talent
agent" as defined in the Act 79 without first obtaining a license.80
In applying the statute, the Labor Commissioner's office in
San Francisco has taken a literal approach to the Act's defini-
tion of a talent agent. In other words, a manager need not actu-
ally procure an engagement for an artist to violate the Act
because offering, promising, or attempting to procure employ-
ment will suffice.8 An unlicensed manager may not defend an
alleged violation by claiming that a given offer, promise, or at-
78. "Artists" are defined in the California Labor Code as "actors and actresses ren-
dering services on the legitimate stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio
artists, musical artists, musical organizations, directors of legitimate stage, motion pic-
ture and radio productions, musical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers,
lyricists, arrangers, and other artists and persons rendering professional services in
motion picture, theatrical, radio, television and other entertainment enterprises." CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1700.4.
79. The Act defines a "talent agent" as "a person or corporation who engages in the
occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
engagements for an artist or artists, except that the activities of procuring, offering or
promising to procure recording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself sub-
ject a person or corporation to regulation and licensing under this chapter." Id. This
definition arguably captures the activities of an attorney who negotiates an employ-
ment agreement, other than a recording contract, on behalf of an artist. Yet it seems
inappropriate to require a member of the bar to obtain a talent agent's license before
performing this task. As of 1983, no decision on this issue had been rendered by the
Labor Commission. See Singer, Regulation of Talent Agents: the Richard Pryor Deter-
mination, 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 255, 257 (1983).
80. See, e.g., Cummins v. The Film Consortium, No. TAC 5-83 at 2 (Cal. Lab.
Comm'r 1983); Bank of America ex rel. Marx v. Fleming, No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 2 (Cal.
Lab. Comm'r 1982); Derek v. Callan, No. 08116 TAC 18-80 SF MP 82-80 at 7, 8 (Cal. Lab.
Comm'r 1982); O'Bannon v. Nelson, No. TAC 1-81 SM Mp 98 at 5 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r
1982); Peckham v. Fair, No. TAC 29-80 SF MP 93 at 3 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1982); Pryor,
No. TAC17 MP114 at 2.
81. See, e.g, Marx, No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 12; Pryor, No. TAC17 MP114 at 15.
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tempt did not result in an engagement for the artist.82 It is also
not a defense that the unlicensed manager merely responded
to an offer initially posed by an employer or that he only nego-
tiated with an offeror.83
Involvement in employment-related activity need not be the
manager's primary activity, nor need it be done on a continu-
ous basis; even "single" or "isolated" violations, regardless of
the procuring entity's overall activity, will trigger the Act. 4
In sum, a manager without a talent agent's license who has
on only one occasion promised a client that he would attempt
to procure a single engagement can be found to have violated
the Talent Agency Act, whether or not he took any subsequent
action on the promise.85
3. Remedies for Violations of the Act
If it is determined that an unlicensed manager did not act as
82. Marx, No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 12. In this petition, the Estate of Groucho Marx
argued, among other things, that Marx's manager, Erin Fleming, had arranged televi-
sion appearances for Marx on shows with Merv Griffin, Bill Cosby, and Bob Hope with-
out a license. It also contended that Ms. Fleming was attempting to promote Marx's
appearance on the Tommorrow Show and other television specials. In determining
that Fleming violated the Act, the hearing officer found that "it was not significant that
none of the television specials was ever produced." Id.
Upon appeal, the Labor Commissioner's determination that Fleming acted as an un-
licensed talent agent in violation of the Act was followed by a jury verdict to the same
effect in a de novo trial in Los Angeles Superior Court. L.A. Daily J., Mar. 31, 1983, at 14.
83. Pryor, No TAC17 MP114 at 15. But see Fischer v. Shepard, No. AMC 7-78 MP 453
(Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1981). This case is discussed in Comment, Personal Managers and
the California Talent Agencies Act: For Whom the Bill Toils, 2 Loy. Err. L.J. 145, 158
(1982). The author states:
In that matter, the personal manager introduced the artist-petitioner to a cast-
ing director who offered the artist a job. The commissioner, however, deter-
mined that the manager did not act as an artists' manager and therefore the
commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The rationale for this
holding was that although the manager opened the door to the meeting, "it
was petitioner and not 'respondent who seized on the opening to arrange for
an audition and who negotiated the terms of the employment.'"
Id. at 158.
84. Cummins, No. TAC 5-83 at 5-6. But see Narramore v. McGuffin, No. SFMP 95
TAC 31/81 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1981), discussed in Comment, supra note 83, at 158. In
that petition, the respondent secured one engagement for the petitioner. The hearing
officer ruled that this was a 'transitory violation' which did not constitute a violation of
the Act. See id.
85. To avoid a violation in these circumstances, a manager could obtain a letter
from a licensed and franchised talent agent requesting the manager to participate in
the procurement process. See supra text accompanying note 6. However, given the
reluctance of talent agents to become involved with developing acts, this option does
little to ameliorate the problem.
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a talent agent as defined in the Act, then the hearing officer
relinquishes his jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter and the
petition is dismissed.86 If, however, a personal manager is
found to have acted as a talent agent without having a license,
the hearing officer typically imposes three sanctions: the man-
agement agreement between the parties is void and unenforce-
able; the artist has no liability to the manager for any monies
advanced in furtherance of the artist's career; and the manager
is ordered to refund all commissions received as a result of the
agreement.8 7 These remedies constitute the complete forfei-
ture of all past and prospective rights that a manager may have
had in his client.
4. The Voiding of All Primary and Collateral Agreements
Invalidating the management agreement between the par-
ties automatically terminates their professional relationship
and settles the issue of the compensation to be paid for man-
agement services. It further invalidates any collateral agree-
ments or contracts entered into by the parties. 88
In Derek v. Callan, Bo Derek won a decision against her unli-
censed manager, Karen Callan, who had secured and negoti-
ated Derek's role in the lucrative film "10."89 As part of the
determination, Callan was forced to relinquish her contractual
claim to fifteen percent of the film's gross receipts, which was
to be paid to her for placing Derek in the film.90 In addition, the
contractual agreement that would have given Callan the rights
to exploit and merchandise Derek's name and likeness in sub-
sequent enterprises was invalidated because the hearing of-
ficer determined that this agreement was part of the
consideration paid for an unlawful relationship.9'
The same result was reached in Bank of America ex rel.
Marx v. Fleming.2 The hearing officer invalidated the contrac-
tual claim of Groucho Marx's personal manager, Erin Fleming,
to ten percent of the gross income from Marx's personal ap-
86. Kennedy, No. TAC 27-82 at 2; Womack No. TAC 22-82 at 2.
87. See, e.g., Cummins, No. TAC 5-83 at 16-17; Mial v. Crosby, No. TAC 27-80 SF MP
91 at 2 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1982); O'Bannon, No. TAC 1-81 SF MP 98 at 2; Pryor, No. TAC
17 MP114 at 20.
88. See, e.g., Derek v. Callan, No. 08116 TAC 18-80 SF MP 82-80.
89. Id. at 4-5.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id.
92. No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 2.
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pearances.1 3 The hearing officer also invalidated an agreement
which provided that Fleming was to receive one-half of the net
cash proceeds from licensing Marx's name and likeness in con-
nection with merchandising and from residuals from the
resyndication of the television show "You Bet Your Life."94
Thus, the order to refund all commissions received under an
unenforceable management agreement can include the re-
funding of all salaries, commissions, expenses, loans, and other
miscellaneous income that the hearing officer determines has
been paid as part of the compensation for services performed
as an unlicensed talent agent.
5. The Possibility of Quantum Meruit Recovery
The critical question to be answered is whether a manager
may keep money received for services not performed as an un-
licensed talent agent. The result in Marx suggests that the an-
swer is yes. The hearing officer in Marx accepted testimony
that, in addition to acting as an unlicensed talent agent, Erin
Fleming served as a secretary, housekeeper, decorator, nurse,
advisor, consultant, confidant, personal manager, and friend to
Groucho Marx.95 During her seven-year relationship with the
comedian, Fleming received over $400,000 in payments.96 Since
the Bank of America, as petitioner, failed to delineate sums
paid to Fleming as a talent agent, the officer estimated that
Fleming devoted not more than twenty percent of her time to
talent agent services and ordered her to repay $80,000 to the
Marx Estate. 7 Unfortunately, the officer did not specify which
services were included in the $80,000 amount.
The definition of "talent agent" in the Act includes persons
providing the primary services performed by a personal man-
ager: counseling and directing artists in the development of
their professional careers. 8 Therefore, it may be assumed that
compensation paid for personal management services, in addi-
tion to talent agent services, is to be refunded in the event that
a manager is found to have violated the Talent Agency Act.
However, the holding in Marx to repay twenty percent can-
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id.
98. CA. LAB. CODE § 1700.4.
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not be said to have reasonably included all personal manage-
ment and talent agent services performed by Fleming.
Counsel for the estate could easily have shown that the sum
paid to Fleming as a talent agent, within the Act's definition,
was eighty percent instead of twenty percent of the total paid.
One explanation for the result is that the hearing officer took
an equitable rather than a literal approach to the statute.99
Further support for a quantum meruit recovery may be
found in Pryor v. Franklin.10 In that decision, the hearing of-
ficer concluded that an unlicensed talent agent, whose viola-
tion included acts of serious moral turpitude, should not be
entitled to "any claim or offset based on the reasonable value
of the services rendered to [the artist]. '"101 This holding sug-
gests that an unlicensed talent agent, whose violation of the
Act did not involve bad faith dealings, should be entitled to an
offset against the Act's normal damages for the reasonable
value of the services rendered to a client.10 2
In Nussbaum v. The Chicken's Company,10 3 the hearing of-
ficer declined to order the repayment of all commissions re-
ceived by the unlicensed manager. 04 The officer determined
that since the illegal contract did not involve moral turpitude
and was not entered into with intent to evade the requirements
of the Act, the repayment of all commissions would be "dispro-
portionately harsh in proportion to the extent of illegality."'1
0 5
The officer, therefore, ordered the repayment of only those
commissions received after the unlicensed agent was informed
99. Precedent for this approach is the contract doctrine of divisibility. This doc-
trine provides that where a promise is legal and has its own separately apportioned
consideration (i.e., distinct from the consideration for an illegal promise), it is enforce-
able except where the other part of the bargain is criminal or immoral in a high degree.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERMLO, supra note 61, § 22-11.
100. No. TAC 17 MP 114.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Precedent for this notion is the contract doctrine of "in pari delicto," which
provides that a party who has performed under an illegal bargain is entitled to quasi-
contractual recovery if he was not guilty of serious moral turpitude. J. CAu sAx & J.
PERILLO, supra note 61, § 22-12. An argument against applying this doctrine to viola-
tions of the Talent Agency Act is that, since the licensing requirement is "for the bene-
fit of the public welfare, health and morality against fr-aud and incompetence," and was
not enacted just to raise revenue, the general rule should be to deny recovery for serv-
ices performed without a license. Id. § 22-7. As a rejoinder, one could argue that
merely procuring employment for an artist without a license is not an act which may
pose a threat of fraud or incompetence to the public.
103. No. TAC 17-80 SF MP 81 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r 1981).
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 6.
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of the licensing requirement and failed to obtain one.0 6 Unfor-
tunately, this was the only petition of those reviewed by this
author in which such a liberal approach was taken.
6. Restitutionary Damages for the Defrauded Petitioner
The Pryor decision added a category of restitutionary dam-
ages to the four types generally allowable. In addition to order-
ing Richard Pryor's manager, David Franklin, to return
approximately $753,000 he received in commissons from 1975 to
1980 for acting as an unlicensed talent agent, the hearing officer
ordered Franklin to pay Pryor $1,850,772, representing monies
and things of value willfully appropriated from Pryor during
their professional relationship. 10 7 The hearing officer added in-
terest of seven percent on the $1,850,772, which totaled $506,929
as of the date of the decision.0 8 He also ordered that interest
accrue daily on the unpaid balance. 10 9 Although Pryor had not
specifically alleged misrepresentation in his petition, the hear-
ing officer amended the petition to conform to the evidence of
misappropriation submitted at the hearing. 10
Franklin refused to turn over books and records that Pryor
claimed would quantify the amount of money misappropriated
by the manager. The hearing officer noted that the power to
subpoena those records was beyond the reach of the Labor
Commissioner."' This, however, did not deter the hearing of-
ficer from arriving at a figure. He based his determination on
money which was unaccounted for by Franklin. The amount
was deduced from testimony by an auditor of Franklin's bank
records who compared deposits and disbursements made by
Franklin with checks which were unaccounted for."2 The
hearing officer added to this figure $75,000, which Franklin was
paid for acting as executive producer on the motion picture
"Bustin' Loose," starring Pryor." 3
While the harsh results in the Pryor case may have been jus-
tified by the manager's misconduct, the precedent for estimat-
106. Id. at 7.
107. Pryor, No. TAC17 MP114 at 25, 26.
108. Id. at 26.
109. Id. at n.17.
110. Id. at 23.
111. Id. at 20.
112. Id. at 28-31.
113. Id. at 33-34.
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ing damages in the absence of documentation is potentially
far-reaching.
7. A Windfall for the Client?
Perhaps the most significant monetary result of invalidating
all management agreements between the parties for a violation
of the Talent Agency Act is that it shuts off the manager's
claim to any share of an artist's future success for which the
manager may be partly responsible. In the petitions of Richard
Pryor and Bo Derek, the termination of the management rela-
tionships resulted in potential lost income to the managers far
in excess of any past commissions which had to be refunded.
As in Katz, Bo Derek's manager, Callan, conferred substan-
tial benefits on Derek by securing her the title role in the
movie "10,"'114 which catapulted Derek to stardom. While "star-
dom" might have been achieved with a different manager, the
fairness of a remedy which allows an artist to retain substan-
tial benefits from a manager without having to compensate the
manager remains questionable. A personal manager need not
breach his common law duties or act in bad faith to violate the
Act. Therefore, an unlicensed manager faces severe damage
from an adverse ruling by the Labor Commissioner for what
could amount to nothing more than an administrative
oversight.
E. Summary
In sum, an unlicensed talent agent who is brought before the
Labor Commissioner may expect severe punishment for even
the most inconsequential involvement in activities relating to
the planning or procurement of employment for his client. He
can also expect an adverse determination to extend beyond an
evaluation of documents or testimony submitted, to findings
based on logical inferences or reasonable estimations made by
the hearing officer. Misconduct by the manager may work
against him, but is not required to trigger the full range of dam-
ages available to the Labor Commissioner.
Assuming that a manager is aware of these potential results,
he would be well advised to obtain a license before approach-
ing any procurement-related activity. If he is unaware of the
possible penalties for noncompliance, there is a question of the
114. Derek, No. 08116 TAC 18-80 SF MP 82-80 at 4.
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fairness in levying such a stiff punishment on ignorance, espe-
cially in a field which often attracts inexperienced persons se-
duced by the illusions of glamour.
Even assuming that a manager is aware of the licensing re-
quirements and results of noncompliance, the cost of compli-
ance may be prohibitive, either because the expenditure
required to qualify may be too great, or because the risks of
running against restrictive guild regulations may undercut the
profitability of rendering personal management services.
IV
Possible Solutions
While there is unquestionably a need for personal managers
in the entertainment industry, those who practice this profes-
sion run the risk of incurring disastrous legal sanctions in the
ordinary course of their business. A solution must be found
which encourages persons to become personal managers and
protects their legitimate interests.
A. Deregulation
One possible solution would be to repeal the Talent Agency
Act and open the process of procuring employment to any in-
terested individual. Not only would this approach face almost
certain defeat because of union and talent agent lobbying, but
it would also eliminate many valuable provisions contained in
the Talent Agency Act.'
The provision in the Act which grants jurisdiction to the La-
bor Commissioner to settle disputes arising under the Act is
especially significant. Notwithstanding criticism of actions
against unlicensed talent agents, this grant of jurisdiction al-
115. See, e.g., the requirement of maintaining records of fees received and of keep-
ing such records open to inspection, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.26-1700.27 (West 1971 &
Cum. Supp. 1984); the prohibition against sending women or minors to places for im-
moral or illegal purposes, id. §§ 1700.31, 1700.33; the prohibition against sending minors
to places where intoxicating liquor is sold or consumed, id. § 1700.34; the requirement
that the talent agent notify the artist of labor trouble in a place of employment, id.
§ 1700.38; the prohibition against talent agents dividing fees with an employer, id.
§ 1700.39; the requirement that the talent agency repay fees and expenses when em-
ployment is not obtained or the artist is not paid, id. § 1700.40; the requirement that the
talent agent reimburse the artist for expenses when the artist is sent outside the city
in an unsuccessful effort to obtain employment, id. § 1700.41; and the granting of juris-
diction to the Labor Commissioner's office to resolve disputes arising under the Act, id.
§ 1700.44.
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lows both the talent agent and the artist access to a form of
civil relief without the expense and formality of litigation. 116
Despite evidence that the Act has not eliminated abuses by tal-
ent agents,117 it is important to retain a legislative mechanism
for punishing abuses that are discovered and brought before
the Labor Commissioner.
B. A Uniform Act
A second alternative is to repeal the Talent Agency Act and
replace it with a uniform act governing all artists' representa-
tives." 8 Again, the chances of repealing the Talent Agency Act
are remote. In addition, because personal managers and talent
agents perform intrinsically different functions," 9 separate
statutes governing the behavior of each would be clearer and
easier to administer.
C. An "Incidental" Booking Exemption
A third proposal is to amend the Talent Agency Act to ex-
empt from licensing personal managers who only "inciden-
tally" engage in employment-related activity. New York's
Employment Agency Act contains such an exemption for the-
atrical employment agents.120 As defined in the New York stat-
ute, a theatrical employment agent is a person who "procures
or attempts to procure employment or engagements" for enter-
tainers. 12 1 The definition exempts "the business of managing
[entertainers] . . .where such business only incidentally in-
volves the seeking of employment therefore.' 22
Such a provision has the advantage of removing the personal
manager from the precarious position that results when the
116. Hearings before the Labor Commissioner are administrative proceedings, and
administrative agencies are not bound by courtroom rules of evidence. See B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 234-36 (1976).
117. See supra note 115; see also Hearings, supra note 2, at 191-92 (statement of
Marie Monte, Deputy, Labor Commission).
118. This is the type of solution posited by Pat McQueeny, President of the Confer-
ence of Personal Managers. She proposes an "Artist's Protection Act," which would
require that any individual representing an artist must follow rules designed to protect
artists from abuses such as unconscionable contracts. Telephone interview with Pat
McQueeny, President of the Conference of Personal Managers (Apr. 3, 1984).
119. See S. SHEMEL & M. KRAsmOvsKy, supra note 3, at 71. See also HEARINGS,
supra note 2, at 158 (statement of Joe Smith).
120. N.Y. GEN. Bus. CODE § 171(8) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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manager is confronted with the need to employ and expose his
client, but is unable to sign him with a licensed agent. The ex-
emption would also benefit artists who are represented by li-
censed talent agents, but who are not satisfied with the type or
amount of engagements that their agents supply.12
3
Two authors in this field, Neville Johnson and Daniel Lang,
argue that, based on the statutory definitions and syntactical
usages, one can infer an intent on the part of the California
Legislature in adopting the Talent Agency Act to "regulate
only those whose primary purpose and function is the procur-
ing of employment for artists.'1 24 While admitting that the de-
termination of legislative intent is sometimes difficult, they
conclude that under this analysis personal managers, as a
class, would not be deemed to be talent agents because their
primary function, unlike that of the talent agent, is not the reg-
ular solicitation of employment for artists.125 However attrac-
tive such speculation may be, it is not supported by the Labor
Commissioner's office, which has interpreted the statute to
cover any attempt at procuring employment without a license,
no matter how isolated or inconsequential.
Talent agents argue that no workable test for enforcing an
incidental booking exemption is possible because of inherent
ambiguities.'26 One method suggested by Johnson and Lang is
to exempt those whose "regular, daily" activities do not in-
clude solicitation of employment. Another approach is to ex-
empt those managers who, despite reasonable efforts to secure
a licensed talent agent for their clients, are unable to do so.
The New York courts have employed the former method in ad-
ministering that state's exemption. 127
Another objection to an incidental booking provision is the
argument by talent agents that the exemption would place
them at a disadvantage with personal managers who would be
free to do a talent agent's job without complying with the stat-
123. See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 160-71 (statement of Larry Wilde, come-
dian, arguing that allowing his personal manager to do incidental booking would
greatly help his career). See also id. at 182 (statement of Mel Shane, former agent and
personal manager).
124. Johnson & Lang, supra note 12, at 388.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 49-50 (statement of Harry Sloan, National
Executive Secretary to the Screen Actors Guild).
127. See, e.g., Friedkin v. Harry Walker Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680, 395 N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1977).
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ute.128 This argument is unconvincing. The amount of time re-
quired to perform the task of either a personal manager or a
talent agent is such that a personal manager would find it diffi-
cult to do both on a full-time basis.'29 Once an artist achieves a
modicum of success, this difficulty becomes even more pro-
nounced, and most personal managers would find it to their ad-
vantage to secure a talent agent to handle bookings. 30 In
addition, it is unlikely that an "incidental booking" exemption
would significantly lessen the amount of business available to
licensed talent agents. As previously noted, personal manag-
ers are already active in negotiating unlicensed bookings.13 '
In addition, talent agents control most of the important en-
gagements, and many have exclusive agreements with
employers. 3 2
In sum, an amendment which adds an incidental booking ex-
emption to the Talent Agency Act is an attractive alternative if
the problems of definition and administration can be resolved.
D. Equitable Remedies for Violations of the Talent Agency Act
Another possiblility is to amend the Act to delineate clear
guidelines for the Labor Commissioner's office to follow in as-
sessing damages for certain types of violations of the Act. The
amendment would provide that a personal manager whose
only violation consisted in his not having a license could be
fined a reasonable amount and ordered to obtain a license
within a reasonable period of time or risk the termination of
his relationship with his client. The personal manager, or for
that matter the licensed talent agent, who has breached some
fiduciary duty to his client or has acted in bad faith could be
more severely punished, according to some of the measures of
damages currently used by the Labor Commissioner. Grada-
tion of violations and ranges of permissible awards could be
specified to closely correspond to harm caused, and offsets for
128. See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 49 (statement of Harry Sloan).
129. See, e.g., id. at 230 (statement of R.L. Melcher, President, Association for Talent
Representatives).
130. See, e.g., id. at 188 (statement of Joe Gottfried, Conference of Personal
Managers).
131. See supra text accompanying note 13.
132. See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 99-104 (statement of Skip Shortlidge, AF of
M, Local No. 67). Rust, I Never Said Life Would Be Fair; The Business of Music in San
Francisco, Music Calendar, July 1984, at 5, Col. 1 (describing leading San Francisco
talent agent and promoter Bill Graham's control of booking in the Bay area).
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benefits conferred or monies advanced, where reasonable,
could be allowed. These amendments would reduce a number
of inequities in the Act's current enforcement.
E. The Need for a Personal Managers Act
Simply amending the Talent Agency Act, however, will not
solve the problem. A separate and specific legislative state-
ment concerning the activities of personal managers is needed.
As noted earlier, one of the principal advantages of the Talent
Agency Act is that it provides the talent agent and artist with
access to an inexpensive form of dispute resolution through
the Labor Commissioner's office.' 33 A similar provision in a
Personal Managers Act could provide the same economic ad-
vantage to personal managers and their clients.3
1. Establishing a Fiduciary Standard
Another reason for adopting a separate act governing per-
sonal managers is the need for a definitive legislative state-
ment regarding the standard of care required of them. The
relationship between a personal manager and an artist is a
highly personal one in which an artist may be vulnerable to a
manager who is controlling virtually every aspect of the artist's
career. Given this relationship, a legislative statement is
needed that establishes the fiduciary obligations a personal
manager owes to his client.135
Certain types of fiduciary violations, such as misrepresenta-
tion and misappropriation, are actionable at common law.
However, a statutory requirement of utmost good faith would
expand the remedies generally available.
133. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44, supra note 46.
134. In granting jurisdiction to an administrative agency, the Personal Managers
Act should specify the method of selecting hearing officers. The inequities in the en-
forcement of the Talent Agency Act indicate that not all administrative law judges in
the Labor Commissioner's office are familiar with the practices of the entertainment
industry. To avoid this, a list of hearing officers selected by groups representing artists
and personal managers could be established. A selection process for mutually agreed
upon hearing officers could also be drafted. See, e.g., Writers Guild of America Basic
Agreement (1977), art. XI-C(2), at 36-37.
135. The nature of the fiduciary relationship is one in which one party depends or
relies upon another to satisfy certain needs, such as in agency relationships. See gen-
erally Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALw. L. REV. 795 (1983).
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2. Avoiding Restrictive Requirements
The specific prohibitions and requirements of any new regu-
latory scheme must be designed to encourage harmonious per-
sonal management relationships. As the United States Senate
Advisory Committee on Industrial Relations has said, regula-
tions should "have a strong bias towards developing the role of
creative individuals, entrepreneurs and small businesses in
net effect and not merely expressed intent."'136
A Personal Managers Act should impose as few restrictions
on entry and compensation as possible. Unlike the Talent
Agency Act, no bond should be required. The requirement
that the manager maintain a separate place of business apart
from his residence should be omitted, and all administrative
fees and charges should be kept to a minimum. This would
ensure that as few people as possible are deterred from becom-
ing personal managers because of the cost of compliance with
the statute. Accordingly, penalties for violations of the statute
which do not involve the breach of any fiduciary duty should
be kept to the minimum necessary to ensure compliance, and
the measure of damages for certain types of violations should
be delineated as clearly as possible to prevent the levying of
excessive penalties.
Given the variety of functions performed by personal manag-
ers, it is difficult to say that a certain fee would always be too
high. If ceilings are set, they should reflect industry norms,
and in no event should they be less than twenty percent for
musical artists and fifteen percent for other artists.137
Similarly, provisions establishing durational limits on per-
sonal management relationships should be avoided, and in no
event should they be set at less than five years for musical art-
ists and three years for other artists. 38 In many circum-
stances, a personal manager will not be rewarded for his efforts
until a critical point in time when an artist suddenly achieves
success. To limit a personal manager's ability to contractually
ensure his involvement with an act past that point may serve
to deprive him of reasonable compensation.
A provision for termination of an agreement by the adminis-
136. FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE 13 (Sept. 1979).
137. These figures have been adopted as maximums by the Conference of Personal
Managers. Telephone interview with Pat McQueeny, supra note 118.
138. Id.
No. 41
COMM/ENT L. J.
trative agency might be desirable if it could be shown that the
personal manager was not using his "best efforts" in carrying
out his management duties. Such a provision would have to be
carefully drafted, however, so as to give the personal manager
the benefit of a presumption that he was acting reasonably.
Personal managers must not be prohibited from obtaining
equity interests in their clients as this would discourage in-
vestment. Any objection that financial involvement creates
conflicts of interest would be met by the Act's requirement of
fiduciary behavior.
In sum, the Personal Managers Act should serve two primary
functions: providing access to an informal method of dispute
resolution for personal managers and artists and defining the
personal manager as a fiduciary for his client's interests. In or-
der to keep administrative requirements and costs to a mini-
mum, licensing should be avoided. Unlike the Talent Agency
Act, in which licensing is needed to ensure compliance with
the Act's specific provisions, a Personal Managers Act, drafted
to function as a statement of policy regarding the proper stan-
dard of care required of the parties, would not require licens-
ing. Thus, the goal of encouraging the entrepreneurial aspects
of the personal management relationship that is so critical to
the development of new talent would be promoted.
As for the difficult question of whether to allow personal
managers to engage in employment-related activities without
obtaining a talent agent's license, a workable incidental book-
ing exemption would be the best solution. If such an exemp-
tion cannot be created, then the current distinction between
licensed talent agents and unlicensed talent agents or personal
managers would have to be preserved. Despite the argument
made earlier that allowing personal managers to book without
a license would not seriously affect the business of talent
agents, allowing them to do so on an unlimited basis would
neutralize the Talent Agency Act and would, in effect, punish
compliance. Because of the Act's positive pronouncements,
this result is undesirable.
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